University of Mississippi

eGrove
Honors Theses

Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale
Honors College)

2008

The Euro Effect: Is the Euro the Cause of Italy's Woes and Spain's
Successes?
Robert Charlton Duke

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis

Recommended Citation
Duke, Robert Charlton, "The Euro Effect: Is the Euro the Cause of Italy's Woes and Spain's Successes?"
(2008). Honors Theses. 2322.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis/2322

This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College (Sally McDonnell
Barksdale Honors College) at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized
administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

THE EURO EFFECT:
IS THE EURO THE CAUSE OF ITALY'S WOES AND SPAIN'S SUCCESSES?

By
Robert Charlton Duke

A thesis presented In partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion
of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies
Croft Institute for International Studies
Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College
University of Mississippi

University, Mississippi
Spring 2008

Approved:

L
Advisor: Dr. Ali Gungoraydinoglu
/
Reader Dr. Kees d spen

Reader: Dr.

Taf^^lla Esposito

©2008
Robert Charlton Duke
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

ii

Table of Contents
iv

List of Figures
List of Abbreviations and Symbols

V

I.

1

Introduction
A.

Italy

3

B.

Spain

7

C.

Comparing Italy and Spain

7

D. The Euro
II.

12
18

Economic theory.
A.

Ricardian trade

18

B.

Wages

20

C.

Technology

22

D.

Exchange Rate and Devaluation

22

E.

Application of the Ricardian Trade Framework

23

III. International Trade Statistics

26

IV. Other Factors

31

V.

36

Results

A. Summary of findings

36

B.

38

Conclusion

42

VI. Appendix
A Numerical Example of Comparative Advantage...

42
43

VII. References

iii

List of Figures
8

Figure 1: GDP per capita in Italy and Spain
Figure 2: Unemployment Rate in Italy and Spain

10

Figure 3: Growth Rate in Italy and Spain

11

Figure 4: Dollar-Euro Exchange Rate

17

Figure 5: Hourly Wage in Italy, Spain, and China

21

Figure 6: Export Propensity of Italy

26

Figure 7: Export Propensity of Spain

27

Figure 8: Exports from Italy and Spain

28

Figure 9: GDP of Italy and Spain

29

Figure 10: Public Debt as a Percentage of GDP in Italy and Spain

31

Figure 11: Public Deficit in Italy and Spain

33

IV

List of Abbreviations and Symbols

ECB

European Central Bank

ERM

Exchange Rate Mechanism

EMU

European Monetary Union

EU

European Union

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

OCA

Optimum Currency Area

a

unit labor requirement

1
a

productivity

P

price

w

wage

the superscript C referring to the x in China where x is one of the
following: a, a p, w

X

I

the superscript I referring to the x in Italy where x is one of the following:
1

a,

V

FT

p, w

the price in free trade

V

$

U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated

€

euros

SlOOb

$100 billion

vi

I. Introduction

Since adopting the euro in 1999, Italy has experienced an economic slowdown.
most notably in the areas of GDP growth, GDP per capita, and exports. But the same
trends have not been present for all European countries. Spain, which has continued to
prosper economically since the euro was introduced, has experienced growth in all of
these economic indicators and several others as well.

I will introduce Italy and Spain and then compare their current economic
situations. Using several major economic Indicators, I will show that while Italy has kept
up or even performed better than Spain In some areas, in many others Italy has
struggled even to maintain its own level of performance from year to year. Then I will
introduce the euro and point out how It has changed Italy, Spain, and Europe as a
whole, including a quick discussion of its performance against the other major world
currency, the U.S. dollar. After that point the paper alms to explain the difference In
economic performance between Spain and Italy.

I will employ the theory of comparative advantage from the Ricardian trade
framework. Upon examination of the factors that are included in determining whether
a country has comparative advantage in a good over another, it can be seen whether or
not Italy's problems stem from a loss of comparative advantage against the rest of the
1

world. Identifying China as a major trading partner of Italy, I will use China as the main
trading partner in the Ricardian trade framework for Italy.

After concluding what causes the loss of comparative advantage for Italy, I will
look at international trade statistics to see if Italy does truly lack comparative
advantage. In other words, if Italy is having trouble exporting goods, then it is losing
comparative advantage versus other countries. Stagnant growth In Italy's export sector
until 2004 and only moderate growth after that along with a trade deficit and slow
growth in real GDP will indicate that Italy is Indeed losing comparative advantage with
the rest of the world. Finally, I will consider other factors, such as domestic finance
problems and political Issues.

The goal of this paper Is to show whether or not the euro Is the main cause of
the Italian economic slowdown. To that end,the evidence that I present proves that the
euro truly Is a major factor in Italy's economic woes, and while not the only factor. Is the
main cause. Yet even with this explanation of the problem, the solution is not so clear.
Italy cannot choose itself for a devaluation of the euro, but it can lobby within the
European Union for such an action. I find this the best path for Italy to take. As the
euro is increasing against the dollar and other currencies faster than It ever has, many
eurozone members will begin to worry about its high exchange rate. With slight and
gradual devaluations, Italy's economic problems should lessen.

The first chapter of this paper consists of introductory sections for Italy, Spain,
and the euro, as well as a comparison of Italy and Spain. Then in chapter II, I will
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present Ricardian trade theory, including the concept of comparative advantage, and
apply it to the Spain and Italian cases. Data will be used to show, using the model, why
Italy has struggled economically since it began using the euro. Chapter III will consist of
an examination of several macroeconomic trends, including export propensity ratio and
total exports, and I will provide definitions of each in addition to offering explanations of
what the results Imply for the case at hand. Chapter IV will include mention of other
factors outside the analysis of this paper that could be affecting the European
economies.

Each factor will be discussed, evaluated, and appropriately deemed

irrelevant, contributing, or major factors in accordance with the evidence provided.
Chapter V summarizes the data and analysis from all previous sections and offers a
logical conclusion with an appropriate policy recommendation based on the findings.

A. Italy
Italy's economic indicators show a few problems for the country In recent years.
Its real GDP growth rate was just 1.9% in 2007 (U.S. CIA 2007). Its GDP per capita of
$28,093 in 2005 Is healthy for a European country, but the growth of its GDP per capita
has slowed since it began using the euro (OECD 2008). Italy's inflation-adjusted export
volume in 2006 was 3% lower than in 2000 (WTO 2007a), and its trade balance has
decreased from a surplus of almost $30b In 1997 to a deficit of over $12b in 2005
(European Union 2007a). Is the euro the cause of these economic woes? With the
current problems in mind, we will now examine Italy's economic history for times when
its currency has become overvalued.
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In the past century, Italy has had to purposefully devalue its currency three times
in order to decrease economic pressures. During the late 1920s, Italy pursued a strong
lira monetary policy.

In the early 1930s, however, several factors led to the

abandonment of this policy.

First of all, the Great Depression, which began In the

United States, led to a general collapse in trade throughout the world. Consequently,
capital movement from the U.S. to Europe slowed severely. Lastly, England's pound
sterling and the U.S. dollar, the world's two most important currencies, depreciated.
which began a devaluation trend in the rest of the world.

The lira's appreciation against these currencies coupled with the popularity of
protectionism in the 1930s caused much difficulty for Italy's exports. Italy's currency
reserves fell from 10.3 to 4.9 billion lire from 1929 to 1934, and at that point, with a
reserve ratio of 0.4, It was clear that the lira needed to be devalued. However, Italy was
in the midst of war In Ethiopia and needed to purchase military equipment from abroad.
Thus, the Italian government decided to hold off on the devaluation until its military
needs were fulfilled. Two years later, Italy followed Its European neighbors France,
Switzerland, Belgium, and Holland, which had devalued their respective currencies
between 10 and 40 percent each. The lira devaluation lowered the gold content in 100
lire from 7.919g to 4.677g, a decrease of 40.9%. The percentage of devaluation was the
same as that of the U.S. dollar two years prior, which resulted in a return to the previous
1-19 dollar-lira ratio (Fratianni & Spinelli 1997).
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Shortly after World War II in 1947, Italy faced major problems. Inflation was
rampant, stock market prices soared, and the dollar was Increasing quickly in free
exchange value against the lira.^ After several devaluations, by 1949, the lira was set at
a value of 625 per dollar and did not need any adjustments for the next two decades

Once more, in 1992, Italy would feel heavy pressure to devalue its currency
although at this point it was a member of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM), a fixed exchange rate system with a 2.25% margin of allowed fluctuation. As a
result of the culmination of many possible factors, including the depreciation of the U.S.
dollar, Italy's high public debt, its high budget deficit, and the Danish vote against the
Maastricht Treaty, the lira weakened to the maximum depreciation it was allowed. The
Italian government tried to maintain its value, increasing the discount rate, but the lira
passed the exchange rate floor put in place by the ERM. In September, Britain, which
was also struggling to remain within the margins, withdrew from the ERM, and that
same day, Italy followed, allowing the lira to depreciate to equilibrium (Branson,
Dornbusch, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz 1993). By May 1993, the lira had fallen in value
16.8% relative to Its September 1992 levels (OECD 1993). While the Italian government
did not pursue monetary policies to devalue the lira, it chose to withdraw from the ERM
^ Luigi Einaudi took control of Italy's monetary policy and decided to set the lira-dollar exchange rate at
350-1, with exchanges with other currencies set accordingly. Then, in an attempt to stabilize the
economy, he developed a new system. Fifty percent of exports would be subject to free market
evaluation of the lira, but the remaining fifty percent would be purchased by the Foreign Exchanges
Department at a rate dependent on the last month's average free market lira-dollar exchange (within a
range of 350 and 650 lira per dollar). This new arrangement was basically a floating exchange rate, and it
allowed the value of the lira to settle between 575 and 600 lira per dollar (Foa 1949). When the pound
sterling devalued against the dollar in 1949, the Italian government decided to allow the lira to devalue to
prevent any appreciation against the dollar that would hurt the competitiveness of Italy's exports
(Fratianni & Spinelli 1997).
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for the sole purpose of allowing its currency to be subject to market pressures, falling in
value until it reached equilibrium.

Economic indicators from before and after the 1992 devaluation show the
positive effect that the decision had on the Italian economy. The export to GDP ratio
rose from 18.3% in 1992 (it had been looming below 20% for six years) to 21.3% in 1993
and continued to rise throughout the mid-1990s. Italy's trade balance to GDP ratio.
which had been below 0.5% between 1987 and 1992, jumped to 3.1% In 1993. Clearly
the devaluation succeeded in the intended effect: to make Italian goods more attractive
abroad. Its exports, which had been struggling, increased greatly with the weaker lira
(OECD 2008).

In 2005, many began to worry about the state of the Italian economy. Exports
are down as the Italians continue to run a deficit in trade balance. The euro's real value
has appreciated consistently since its release In 1999, and, consequently, Italy's export
sectors have suffered. Vincenzo Guzzo (2005), at the Morgan-Stanley Global Economic
Forum, claimed that Italy would need a 25% devaluation of Its currency to return to pre1999 competitiveness levels.

Coincidentally, this is roughly the same percentage

devaluation that Italy experienced in the early 1990s as a result of the 1992 withdrawal
from the ERM. Based on the effect of that previous devaluation - a fall in domestic
demand and an increase In debt - and the fact that the only way to achieve such a
devaluation now would be to withdraw from the EMU, he concludes that it is not a valid
solution to Italy's current problems because such an abrupt change in the exchange rate
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would most likely cause the same repercussions as the depreciation in the early 1990s
did: the devaluation would lower the currency's purchasing power without changing
domestic income. Domestic demand would plummet, causing lower tax revenue since
fewer goods are produced and consumed, and thus, Italy would have to default on its
debt or choose an extremely tight fiscal policy.

B. Spain
After dictator Francisco Franco's death in 1975, Spain was lagging both politically
and economically compared to its European neighbors. The major issue in the 1982
elections was unemployment, which was high at 16%, but 14% Inflation was also a
concern as was stagnant GDP (Lancaster 1984). Since then Spain has tamed the inflation
problem, bringing it down to 3.5% in 2006. Unemployment is reduced to 8.1%, four
tenths of a point below the EU average (U.S. CIA 2007). Spain's economic situation is
vastly different from that of Italy. Spain's real GDP growth rate has been above 2.5% in
every year between 1997 and 2005 (OECD 2008). Its exports were 14% higher in 2006
than In 2000(WTO 2007b). Spain's economic experience since the release of the euro
seems to be much different than Italy's woes.

C. Comparing Italy and Spain
With the time period of 1997-2005, the first few years can show the established
position of each country before the euro. Then the middle years show how each
country performed in transition. The later years show how the countries are emerging
from adoption of the new currency.

In this section, we will examine how Spain
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improved in several major economic indicators, such as GDP per capita, unemployment
rate, and growth rate, during and following the introduction of the euro. At the same
time, Italy has not been quite as successful. While it might have improved in each area,
its improvement was not as substantial as that of Spain.

Figure 1 shows the GDP per capita for both Italy and Spain from 1997 to 2005.
GDP, or gross domestic product, is the sum of consumption, investment, government
expenditure, and exports minus imports. GDP per capita is the country's GDP divided by
its population. It is commonly used as a measure of living standards of a country.

Figure 1: GDP per capita in Italy and Spain
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In 1997, Italy's GDP per capita was about $5,000 more than Spain's, but eight years later
they were almost equal. Spain shows steady, substantial growth from 1997-2005, while
Italy Improves very little during the same time. Italy's GDP per capita Increased by 23%
over the nine-year period while Spain's jumped 57.17% during the same period. Put
differently, in 1997 Italy's GDP per capita was 119.3% of the EU average, while Spain's
was 93.5% of the EU average. By 2005, Italy's GDP per capita had fallen to 105.1% of
the EU average and Spain's had risen to 102.9% of the EU average (European Union
2007a). Spain's GDP per capita Increases consistently, creating almost a line over the
nine years. Figure 1 is very helpful in analyzing the economic performance of Spain and
Italy. Both have similarly Increasing GDP per capita until the euro Is released In 2002.
From that point forward, Italy's increasing trend in GDP per capita ceases while Spain's
continues.

In 1997 Spain had a staggering unemployment rate of 16.6%, and Italy's rate of
11.2% was fairly high as well.

Eight years later, the difference between the two

countries' unemployment rates Is about 1.5%. Figure 2 shows the unemployment rate
between 1997 and 2005 for Italy and Spain.
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Figure 2: Unemployment Rate in Italy and Spain

Source; OECD (2008)

Again, while both countries show improvement throughout the period, Spain clearly
shows more. Italy's unemployment drops from about 11.5% in 1997 to 7.9% in 2005,
while Spain's fell from 16.8% to 9.2% in the same years. Spain's unemployment rate
was still higher as of 2005, but it is more impressive that the unemployment rate almost
cut in half between 1997 and 2005. Italy's fell substantially as well, but not nearly as
drastically as Spain's. By 2006, both Italy and Spain have unemployment rates below
the EU average.

Figure 3, which shows real GDP growth rate, is the most telling in the analysis of
how Italy and Spain handled the switch to the euro. Real GDP is defined as the GDP
with inflation taken out. Thus, while a currency with increasing purchasing power will
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artificially inflate GDP, it does not affect real GDP. The growth rate of real GDP is the
percent change in real GDP from one year to the next.

Figure 3: Growth Rate in Italy and Spain
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Spain's growth rate was higher before the euro in 1997, at almost twice the rate of
Italy's. Both countries had increasing growth rates until the release of the euro, in 1999.
With a maximum in 2000, both experienced a fall during 2001 and 2002. The difference
is evident in the years that follow as Spain slowly improves its growth rate but Italy does
not. While Spain recovered and increased its growth rate back over 3%, Italy continued
to struggle, with almost zero growth in 2003 and negative growth in 2005. Even when
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Spain's growth was at its lowest during this period, its real GDP was still increasing at a
healthy 2.7%.

The economic indicators presented In this section begin to show how much Italy
and Spain differ in their current economic situations. In terms of both GDP per capita
and unemployment rate, Italy was much better off in 1997, but by 2005 the gap
between the indicators In the two countries had narrowed to almost 0 as shown In
figures 2 and 3. Figure 4 displays that Italy was never able to keep up with Spain In
growth, as Spain had better than 3% growth every year except one (2002), while Italy
had growth below 3% ever year except one (2000). Furthermore, Italy had 1% growth
or less from 2002-2005. The three figures presented in this section are evidence that
Indeed Italy has struggled economically relative to its fellow European country of Spain.

In this section I have shown that Spain performed better than Italy between
1997 and 2005 in GDP per capita, real GDP growth rate, and unemployment rate. Italy
does show some improvement in unemployment rate, but all positive trends in GDP per
capita and real GDP growth rate stop when the euro is officially adopted for use by the
original 11 countries. In the subsequent sections I will invoke economic theory and
more data to explain the cause of the difference In the countries' performances.

D. The Euro

Even before its release into the market In 1999, the euro was a highly-debated
topic.

Eleven (now thirteen) nations discarded their traditional currencies to join

together into a monetary union, the European Monetary Union (EMU), with the euro as
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their common currency. In creating the monetary union, the member states ceded
power over their monetary policy to a central bank, the European Central Bank (ECB).
Prior to the official creation of the EMU in 1999, opinions were divided regarding
whether the step in European integration would be a good idea.

Many saw the advantages in monetary union. According to the EU, the use of
the euro offers advantages such as the elimination of exchange rate fluctuations, the
elimination of transaction costs, lower Interest rates, price stability, shelter from
external shocks, and making the eurozone more appealing for foreign investment. The
elimination of exchange rate fluctuations Is guaranteed because there are no longer
different countries among the eurozone countries. There is no fluctuation in the rate of
exchange of the euro in Spain and the euro in France like there had been between the
peseta and the franc because the euro has the same value everywhere. The elimination
of transaction costs is a derivative of the lack of exchange rate fluctuations. Since there
is no exchange rate, businesses and individuals can transact across borders without
exchange fees, making the eurozone a more appealing location for foreign investment.
Lower interest rates are also a result in part of the elimination of exchange rate
fluctuations in addition to the increased control on government debt. External shocks
will have less impact because so much of European trade remains within the borders of
the eurozone, meaning that the economic happenings in other parts of the world will
have less, although still some, effect on the euro zone countries (European Union
2007b).

Some economists pointed out that the argument of the elimination of

exchange rates that the euro would bring is not the biggest advantage of the EMU as
13

many claimed. Dornbusch and Jacquet (2000) argued that the most important impact
would be seen In capital markets, as corporations would have more and cheaper options
on how to finance themselves and the development of venture capital markets would
ease start-up business activity.

There were others that did not support the idea of the eurozone. Among others.
Josef Joffe (1997) claimed that the euro is in large part a political maneuver for the
Germans and French. He noted that with state sovereignty over monetary policy being
given to the ECB and with the Stability Pact that would limit each member state's ability
to guide its own fiscal policy, each European state would have little ability to manage Its
own economy.

Martin (2001) invokes the theory of optimum currency areas (OCAs), which
includes several requirements for an area to be qualified to share a common currency.
These tenets are centered on homogeneity of major economic indicators in the different
parts that make up the area in question. The idea behind the OCA theory is that
homogeneity among regions will mean that external shocks will not hurt any part of the
area drastically more than another, and central monetary policy will be able to be
productive for all regions involved. GDP per capita, unemployment rates, and wage
rates are expected to be similar for an area to be considered an OCA. Martin argues
that the eurozone (the countries that use the euro) does not fit the definition of an OCA.
He points out that GDP per capita for countries within the eurozone Is twice as varied as
regions in the USA. Similarly, unemployment rates can vary by as much as a factor of 10
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among eurozone countries. Martin theorizes that the convergence criteria used were
intended to test then-future eurozone as an OCA, but he asserts that the use of
countries for comparison is not specific enough. Variance within countries is large
enough to justify analysis of OCA-qualification based on regions within countries instead
of the broader country analysis. By Martin's argument, the differences among regions
will cause many problems in eurozone because there cannot be a unified monetary
policy that all users of the euro will like.

Euro-opposition in Italy, however, did not end after the release of the new
currency. In 2005, the Northern League, a small Italian political party, began leading
rallies and protests in favor of returning to the lira, citing an increase in prices in Italy
since the adoption of the euro {International Herald Tribune 2005). While there was
opposition to the euro in Italy, it is clear that the Italian government as a whole was in
favor of adopting the euro, as it chose to be a part of the monetary union and took
measures to satisfy the minimum economic requirements for use of the euro. Italian
citizens, however, were a little timid. The European Commission took caution in the
years leading up the public release of the euro. For the two years before its official
release on New Year's Day, 2002, it hired Gallup Europe to do periodic surveys on public
opinion of the unified currency. In May 2001, Italian respondents were among the least
knowledgeable about the release of the euro - including when It would happen and the
rules on how long after that date national currencies could be used. In addition, Italy
was the second highest country (Greece was first) in believing that switching to the euro
would be inconvenient on a personal level. Italians were also among the highest
15

respondents to fear being cheated by merchants with the new currency (Gallup Europe
2001). But a survey a year later, about 5 months after the currency had been put into
circulation, showed that most of the Italians' concerns had been put at ease, as they
responded that the adjustment had been easier than they expected.

There was

widespread belief among the Italian respondents, however, that unjustified price hikes
came with the new currency. These fears were more than the expected "rounding-up
of prices when they were converted from lira to euros but of price increases of many
basic goods that merchants were attempting to hide under the guise of the new
currency(Optem 2002).

Figure 4 shows the exchange rate between the euro and the U.S. dollar since the
introduction of the unified European currency in 1999. The exchange rate for two
currencies offers how much of one currency is worth in another currency's
denomination. If $1.00 Is equivalent to 1.2€, then the dollar-euro exchange rate is 1.2.
In other words, one U.S. dollar can buy 1.20€, or equivalently, one euro can buy about
$0.83. The ECB allows the euro to float in value on the currency exchange markets.
which means its value can fluctuate in value against other currencies.^

^ Countries must choose whether they want to use monetary policy to adjust the interest rate to avoid
recession and inflation or to fix the exchange rate of their currencies. Robert Mundell introduced the
theory of the "impossible trinity" in his work during the 1960s, theorizing that a country can choose at
most two of the following three: 1) autonomy of monetary policy, 2) fixed exchange rate, and 3) capital
mobility. Because almost all countries today allow free movement of capital, a country must choose
between control of monetary policy and a fixed exchange rate (Oatley 2006, Krugman 1999).
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Figure 4: Dollar-Euro Exchange Rate
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The y-axis values represent the ratio of dollar-euro exchange.

Hence, in 1999,

when the euro was released, the value was about 1.17, and thus, one euro bought
$1.17. While the currency was introduced at an exchange rate of about $1.17 per euro.
the rate dropped quickly below $1.00. Since 2003, the euro has traded for more than
$1.00, and it has steadily grown in value.

Now, one euro can buy more than $1.50.

Later we will examine how this high exchange rate between the euro and the dollar, and
between the euro and all other currencies for that matter, has affected Italy's
international competitiveness.
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II. Economic theory

In this section I will explain some of the theory of comparative advantage as a
part of the Ricardian trade framework. I will use this theory to investigate whether
globalization and macroeconomic policies provide an explanation to the difference in
economic performance of Spain and Italy.

A. Ricardian trade
The Ricardian model of trade is based on two basic economic concepts:
opportunity cost and comparative advantage. The opportunity cost of a good is what
must be forfeited in order to produce that good. Comparative advantage determines
the pattern of trade of two goods between two countries. The Ricardian model of trade
takes the concept of comparative advantage to the International level and is based on
the idea that differences in productivity of labor from country to country explain
international trade (Krugman & Obstfield 2006). Suppose Italy can produce 100,000
bottles of wine or 5000 motors.

Without loss of generality, we assume constant

productivity at any output level. The idea is that Italy must choose how to allocate its
resources. For each motor It makes, it must forego the production of 20 bottles of wine.
Thus, Italy's opportunity cost for a motor is 20 bottles of wine.

Conversely, Its

opportunity cost for a bottle of wine Is one-twentieth of a motor. Assume also that
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China can produce 800,000 bottles of wine or 200,000 motors due to its abundance in
high-skilled labor. The opportunity cost for a Chinese motor is thus 4 bottles of wine.
while the opportunity cost for a bottle of wine Is one-fourth of a motor. In this example.
China has the resources to produce more motors and bottles of wine than Italy.
However, the cost of wine production per bottle Is more expensive In terms of motors
for China than It is for Italy. On the other hand, it Is relatively cheaper for China to
produce motors in terms of bottles of wine. Hence, China has a comparative advantage
over Italy in motor production, and Italy has a comparative advantage over China in
wine production. In this example, Ricardian trade implies that Italy should produce and
export wine to China while China should produce and export motors to Italy.

Relative labor productivity and relative price are related. In perfect competition.
there exists a zero profit condition. That Is, total revenue equals total cost (TR = TC).
Thus, average revenue, which is the same as price, equals average cost(AR = P = AC). In
other words, since price = cost in perfect competition, Ricardian theory can be applied
to relative prices and relative labor productivities instead of relative costs. Price P =
Wi * an where Wi represents the wage rate of product i and an represents the unit
labor requirement of product i (the number of hours of labor required to produce a unit
pi

of the product). The relative price of wine In terms of motors for Italy is:
I
^Lw

Thiic
. Thus,
“m

^Lm

^Lm

Wi

, and the relative price of wine in terms of motors for China is:
I

pC
pC

'k =

Pjn

Wc

Olm

and thus,0= ^.
When
“Lm
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<
or, equivalently,
< ^,
“rn
^Lm

Italy
^Lm

will export wine to China because wine is relatively cheaper for Italy to produce and
motors are relatively cheaper for China to produce (Krugman and Obstfeld 2006).^

Using the Ricardian model, we can look at a multi-good scenario, which is more
realistic when discussing any real trade issue. Italy and China are not just trading two
goods with each other. For all goods that Italy and China want to trade, we can consider
= w{* a[ and

= wf * af where the subscript 1 represents good 1. Similarly, we

could look at goods 2, 3, 4, etc., with respective subscripts 2, 3, 4, etc. If p^ = w{ * a[ <
wf ♦ af = p^, then China will want to buy good 1 from Italy for a free trade price p
FT

such that p^ <p

FT

< p^. In this case, Italy is making money by selling it to China (the

free trade price is higher than the price charged in Italy) and China is paying less for the
Italian good than it would pay for the Chinese equivalent (the free trade price Is less
than the price charged in China).

B. Wages
In determining the comparative advantage between Italy and China, wf < w[
for all goods because China's wage rate Is much lower than Italy's. Figure 5 illustrates
the average hourly wage rate in manufacturing In terms of US$ for the years 1997-2006.

'See Appendix for a numerical example.
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Figure 5: Hourly Wage in Italy, Spain, and China
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It is obvious that the wage rate in Italy sharply rose when the euro was put into
circulation in 2002. Spain's wage rate has followed a similar path of change over time as
Italy, but the Spanish wage rate has been about $2 lower per hour during the whole
period. At the same time, China's hourly wage rate has slowly been climbing {U.S. BLS
2008a). The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics only gives the labor statistics for 2002-2004
because it has grown concerned about the quality of the data it was collecting. It last
reported China's hourly wage rate in 2004 as $0.67 (U.S. BLS 2008b). The National
Bureau of Statistics of China reports that in 2006, the average daily wage per urban
worker was 83.66 yuan, which today is equivalent to $11.71, less than the average
Italian worker makes in an hour (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2007). It is also
important to note that the value of the yuan has been climbing against the dollar.
During 2006, the yuan was valued lower versus the dollar; thus, the wage rate was even
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lower than $11.71. Even without exact data for several of the years, the important
aspect for this analysis is that China's wage rate per hour is significantly lower than that
of Italy. In 2003, for example, the wage rate in China was $0.62 while that in Italy was
$20.29 and that of Spain was $17.72. Thus, Italy's wage rate was over 32 times as much
as China's, while Spain's over 28 times the hourly wage rate in China.

C. Technology
Since wf < w[ for all goods, for Italy to export a good to China, the following
must be true: a[ < af. In addition, since the wage rate is so much lower in China than
in Italy, Italy's labor productivity (-^) needs to be substantially higher than that of China.
In fact, in the 2003 example, since Italy's wage rate was 32 times that of China, Italy's
unit labor requirement would need to be more than 32 times less than that of China in
order to have comparative advantage in a particular good and thus export the good. In
the Ricardian framework, labor productivity serves as the technological component.
With better technology a worker is more productive, and thus the labor productivity is
higher, meaning a[ is lower. Since Italy does export goods to China, we can assume that
the unit labor requirement for producing those goods must be much lower in Italy than
in China.

D. Exchange Rate and Devaluation
One other factor can influence trade in the Ricardian model. If the value of the
currency of a country goes up relative to the other country, such a change is reflected in
a multiplier on the price p. For example, if the lira went up 10% against the yuan, Italian
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goods would be 10% more expensive. Thus, even if before the increase in value of the
lira the equation w[ *

< wf

af held, the 10% increase could make It so that

> p^. If this occurred, China would no longer wish to import the good from Italy,
Instead choosing to produce it itself.

Before Italy adopted the euro, the Italian

government could enact policies to alter the value of the lira in order to help its exports.
In the twentieth century, there were three times when Italy did devalue the lira in order
to Increase its International competitiveness.

E. Application of the Ricardian Trade Framework
Of the three factors that make up the Ricardian model, only one is flexible
enough to be changed in the short term - exchange rate. Wages cannot go down.
Workers are accustomed to their wage level, and while wages may remain the same or
Increase, they cannot decrease. The technology factor Is based on labor productivity,
and while technology can be improved. It usually takes years of investment and research
to increase the technology component. The exchange rate, however, can be changed at
any point through monetary policy. Thus, of the three factors, altering the exchange
rate is the easiest method of increasing a country's comparative advantage, which is
why Italy chose to devalue its currency when it was losing comparative advantage
several times over the past 100 years.

Italy's exports come primarily from the industries of foodstuffs, engineering
products, textiles, chemicals, production machinery, minerals, motor vehicles, transport
equipment. Of those exports, 57.7% remain within the European Union (WTO 2007a).
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With almost 43% of Italy's exports leaving the eurozone, Italy is affected more by
fluctuations in the exchange rate of the euro with other currencies than countries that
export more within the eurozone. Outside Europe and the United States, China is one
of Italy's biggest trading partners. Italy imports more goods and services from China
than It does from any other non-EU country(WTO 2007a).

Spain, on the other hand, exports 70% of its goods within the EU (WTO 2007b).
With only 30% of its goods being sold to non-EU countries. Its export sector is less
sensitive to increases in the exchange rate of the euro versus other currencies. Only
those 30% of total exports are subject to the multiplier effect, which as mentioned
previously, makes the price of goods higher for foreign buyers solely due to the
exchange rate.

When Italy began using the euro, it ceded the power of setting monetary policy
to the European Central Bank. This change caused problems in its export sector for two
reasons. First, the eurozone, which includes economic powers such as Germany and
France, makes the euro a very strong currency. Italy as part of the eurozone has a
stronger currency than It would have if it were still using the lira. This first problem
leads to another. Because one central bank is setting monetary policy to manage the
whole eurozone, Italy's interests are not the only ones considered. While before Italy
could devalue its currency if it wanted to boost exports, the eurozone as a whole may
not want to devalue the euro. While it would benefit Italy, it could be detrimental to
other countries in the monetary union. A forced devaluation of the euro would have to
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be expected to help many of the eurozone countries in order for the ECB to choose to
adopt such a policy.

We now have the theory and the tools to examine the Italian case. Ricardian
trade theory supports that if a country has a currency with a high exchange rate versus
currencies of the rest of the world, Its difficulty in maintaining comparative advantage
should be evident In a loss of exports. Unfortunately, the inability to be competitive
internationally can have a snowball effect from year to year. Low exports one year
stymies investment for the future and in turn, the country's ability to innovate in
technology to be more productive. In section III, I will examine Italy's export statistics to
see whether the euro caused a deteriorating problem of a lack of international
competitiveness for Italy.
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in. International Trade Statistics
In this section, we will examine several international trade statistical indicators,
namely export propensity rate, total exports, and GDP, of both Italy and Spain to see
how each country has fared in trade through the release of the euro.

Figure 6: Export Propensity of Italy
«

Italy

OECD

Export propensity rate (goods and services)
29.0

(at current prices and exchange rates)

28.0
27.0 26.0'
25.0
24.0
23.0 A

22.0
1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

26

2002

2003

2004

2005 ' 2006 -

Figure 7: Export Propensity of Spain
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Figure 6 and 7 show the export propensity rate for Italy and Spain during the
years 1997-2006. The export propensity rate is the ratio of total exports to GDP. The
export propensity rate is indicative of the country's dependence on exports in its
economy. Spain's export propensity rate increases and then decreases during the
period, and ends at about the same level in 2006 as it was in 1997. Italy, on the other
hand, has an increasing trend line for the period, meaning that Italy's economy is
becoming more export-oriented.

Knowing that Italy is becoming more reliant on

exports, we will now examine the total exports for both countries.
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Figure 8: Exports from Italy and Spain
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It is clear that Italy's export level remained almost unchanged between 2000 and
2003. Then, it increased modestly for the last two years in the period. Spain's exports
were increasing for every year in the period.

Another important measure Is the

difference between exports and imports, known as the current account balance. A
negative current account balance, meaning the country imports more than it exports.
implies a lack of comparative advantage in international trade. Italy's current account
balance was +29.7 million euros in 1997, but it had fallen to -37.9 million euros by 2006
(European Union 2007a). Thus, while Italy's exports increased moderately in 2004 and
2005, its imports increased more, meaning that overall it lost competitiveness
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internationally.

Also, with adjustments for inflation applied, Italy's export volume

actually decreases from 2000 to 2006 (WTO 2007a).

Spain's exports, however.

increased by 14% between 2000 and 2006 with inflation removed.

Figure 9: GDP of Italy and Spain
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Although Italy has more total exports and a higher GDP than Spain, for the
purposes of this analysis it is more important to consider the trend over time in each
statistic. Both countries remained fairly static in export growth from 1997 until 2002.
Then Spain's exports began to increase while Italy's exports slowly decreased. In GDP,
on the other hand, Spain has experienced consistent growth over the period. About
$650b in 1997, by 2005 Spain has almost doubled its GDP, with a total of about $1200b.
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Italy, however, did not increase Its GDP as quickly. In 1997 the Italian GDP was about
$1300b and It had Increased modestly to just over $1600b in 2005.

Italy has undoubtedly undergone several economic problems during the time
around the release of the euro. Its growth and GDP per capita showed very little
Improvement. Additionally, from an international trade perspective, Italy is struggling
with an almost unchanging GDP, an increasing current account deficit, and a slowdown
in exports while at the same time its economy is becoming more reliant on exports.
Thus, the Ricardian trade theory is very applicable. The struggling exports and GDP
combined with the increasing trade deficit indicate that Italy indeed Is losing
comparative advantage with its trade partners. While the Ricardian trade analysis Is
successful in Identifying a major cause of Italy's economic woes, it is important to
consider that other factors may be contributing to the problem.

30

IV. Other Factors
The euro may not be the only cause of Italy's economic struggles, in this section
will examine some domestic economic indicators, such as public debt and public
deficit, as well as a few political factors.

Figure 10 shows the public debt as a

percentage of GDP of both Italy and Spain.

Figure 10: Public Debt as a Percentage of GDP in Italy and Spain

Public Debt
140
120
100
Q.

tUll
l
l
l
l
l
I III

Q

80 -

o

60

NP

40
20
0

■ Italy
■ Spain

im mm
1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Source: European Union (2007a)

For all years from 1997-2006 Italy's debt is almost twice as much as Spain's as a
percentage of each country's GDP. Spain's debt falls slowly but consistently over time,
ending at 39.7% in 2006. Italy's, on the other hand, fails slightly and then increases
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again. Furthermore, the percentage for Italy is always over 100%. This means that
Italy's debt Is consistently more than its GDP. For perspective, Italy ranks sixth highest
in the world In debt as a percentage of GDP. Countries with a higher percentage include
Zimbabwe, Lebanon, and Jamaica. Spain, on the other hand, has the 66^*' highest
percentage,just lower than that of the United States (U.S. CIA 2007).

Public debt in general is not necessarily a bad thing. Governments can borrow
money to invest into the future of the economy, through research and development.
education, and worker training. Such investments for the future of the economy in
theory produce gains in the future that provide for the government to pay off its debts
(U.S. GAO 2004). However, Italy's public debt is extremely high. Higher debt means
higher interest payments, which require more surplus money. In other words, Italy and
Spain may run a surplus budget one year of equal amounts. Spain will be able to pay off
a higher portion of its public debt because its interest payments are lower. Italy will not
be able to pay off as much, and hence. It will take Italy longer to pay off all of its debt.
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Figure 11: Public Deficit in Italy and Spain

Source: European Union {2007a)

Figure 11 shows the public deficit a percentage of GDP of Italy and Spain. Public
deficit is defined as the difference of government expenditures and revenues. In figure
11, negative values imply a surplus while positive values signify a deficit. A surplus is
beneficial because the excess revenues can be used to reduce the public debt or to
invest in the country's economy, which can cause growth in future years. Clearly both
Spain and Italy kept deficit spending under control during the period 1997-2006. In the
last two years Spain begins to create a little deficit, but Italy consistently had a surplus
each year. This pattern is a good sign for the Italian economy, as a continuation of
surplus years should continue to lower its public debt slowly. As previously mentioned.
Italy's public debt as a percentage of GDP has dropped moderately over the 10-year
period, although not as quickly as that of Spain. Italy remains, however, as one of the
few countries in the world with more debt than annual GDP.
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In addition to growth problems Italy also faces a very high public debt. As figure
10 shows, Italy has consistently had more public debt than GDP for all years 1997-2007.
Spain, on the other hand, lowered its debt as a percentage to GDP from just over 60% in
1997 to just below 40% in 2005. The information in figure 11 shows that Spain has
steadily Increased its spending, starting at over a 3% surplus in 1997 and ending with
almost a 2% deficit in 2006. Italy has had a surplus every year. This data implies that
the changes in debt as a percentage of GDP were probably more an effect of GDP than
any variance in debt. Spain's GDP growth allowed for more deficit spending without
hurting its debt-GDP ratio while Italy's poor growth made it very difficult to cut its debtGDP ratio.

In addition to public debt problem for Italy, there may be several non-economic
factors that are influencing the Italian economic situation. When the euro was released.
many Italians rounded up their prices after conversion for convenience and a little extra
profit. For example, a standard bus fare cost 1500 lire, but bus companies threatened
to charge 1 euro, the equivalent of about 1900 lire, to simplify payment (Clark 2001).
While bothersome to consumers, these small changes in price are unlikely to have
caused the profound slowdown of real GDP growth and exports.

Other possible

contributing factors could be corruption In the government and the existence of a vast
black market largely run by the mafia, but there is not enough evidence to consider
either of these as valid causes of the recent economic troubles.
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There is a possibility that Spain's recent growth is "catch-up" growth for the time
that Spain fell behind during the Franco years. Thus, comparing Italy to Spain could be
an unfair comparison for Italy. However, the analysis of this paper has encompassed
much more than a direct comparison of Italy and Spain. It includes economic data and
trade statistics that are relevant in explaining Italy's struggles even without comparison
to Spain.

Lastly, European countries' inability to reform labor markets could be a reason
why their economies are struggling. It is widely recognized among economists such as
Caimfors (2001) and Siebert (1997) that the inability to reform labor markets In Europe
has caused the very high unemployment rates that most European countries face.
However, since Italy and Spain have unemployment rates below the EU average and I
have shown that other factors are more pertinent in explaining the causes of Italy's
economic problems, the lack of labor market reform is not a major factor In this
analysis.
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V. Results
A. Simunary of findings

As of April 1; 2008, the euro was valued at $1.5819, and as figure 4 shows, it has
Increased In value versus the dollar very consistently and quickly since 2006. The euro's
strength versus world currencies appears to have caused problems for some EU
member countries. Italy's growth has slowed to less than 1% between 2002 and 2005,
while Spain's has remained above 2.5% for all years since 1997. This growth is also
reflected in GDP per capita, as Spain, which had a GDP per capita $5000 less than that of
Italy in 1997, now has an almost equal GDP per capita to Italy. Also, Italy's Inflationadjusted export volume in 2006 was 97% of what it was In 2000. To investigate the
cause of these economic problems in Italy, I began with a Ricardian analysis.

The Ricardian analysis of Italy led to the conclusion that Italy is having trouble
competing Internationally with non-EU countries. In particular, it has been difficult for
Italian exports to remain competitive with one of its largest non-EU trading partners.
China.

It Is well known that China has the distinct advantage over most of the

developed world in its low wages. China's wages are in fact almost 10 times less than
Italy's. Thus, the w variable reflects how wage rates in one country can affect another
country. According to the Ricardian model, the fact that Italy's wages are so much
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higher than China's means that Italy's unit labor requirement must be much lower than
China's for all the goods that it exports to China. In other words. It means that Italy
must be that much more productive In producing the goods that It intends to export to
China. Workers become more productive with better technology, which leads to more
exports and thus more investment and thus more improvement of technology.

It appears that Italy's struggling economic growth was only compounded when
the euro was released, and the low growth over so many years produced this snowball
effect of lacking technology leading to lower exports leading to less investment finally
causing a lack of technological improvement.

But the euro's exchange rate only

increased that problem. The Ricardian model states that the price of a good is a
proportional function of the unit labor requirement and the wage rate. But when the
currency valuates against the trading partner's currency, this change is reflected In the
Ricardian model as a multiplier of the price. Thus, Italy's productivity needed to be even
better to compensate for the high exchange rate, but as the trade numbers show, Italy
has not been able to achieve that goal.

The Ricardian trade framework provides the theory towards explaining the
Italian economic woes, but the international trade Indicators must prove that a loss of
comparative advantage Is the problem.

An examination of exports and export

propensity shows that it is evident that Italy's export sector Is struggling as its economy
Is becoming more dependent on exports. The GDP totals In figure 9 are consistent with
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the implications of figures 6 and 8. With struggling exports and a higher dependence on
them, Italy's GDP growth slows to almost zero from 2002 to 2006.

Domestically, Italy Is suffering from extremely high debt. Few countries have a
higher debt as a percentage of GDP than Italy, and although it has created a surplus In
recent years, the debt is so large that it cannot decrease that quickly.

Moderate

Improvement in the first few years of the twenty-first century is encouraging, but with
public debt totaling over 105% of GDP still, debt obviously remains to be a nagging
problem for Italy and will continue to be problematic even if the Italian government
whittles It with small surpluses each year.

B. Conclusion

Italy's economy clearly is having problems, but the causes are not so obvious. Its
growth rate has been decreasing since the release of the euro and have even been
negative for a few years, but compared with the similar European country of Spain, it is
at first not understandable. While Spain's growth rates also dropped In the few years
following the euro's release, it rebounded and has been increasing since then. Subtle
differences in their economies can help to explain partially their differing economic
performance through the Ricardian model of trade.

While both countries are members of the eurozone, the adoption of the new
unified currency has not had the same effect on each. Spain's economy and more
particularly its trade sectors seem not to have suffered much, while Italy's economy has
experienced low to negative growth and difficulties exporting goods. One of the causes
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in this difference of economic performance is the breakdown of trade partners of each
country. .About 70% of Spain's exports remain within the ED. Thus, those goods are
traded with other countries that use the euro and so Spain's export sector is not at a
disadvantage due to the multiplier effect that a high exchange rate can have on
international trade prices. Italy, on the other hand, exports almost 43% of its goods to
non-EU countries. From the viewpoint of those non-EU buyers, Italian goods are more
expensive due to the strong exchange rate of the euro against almost all world
currencies. As the euro increases in value against a country's currency, that country
sees the price of Italian goods being multiplied by a higher and higher exchange rate,
Thus, Italian producers must be more productive or pay lower wages in order to
compensate for the multiplier effect that the exchange rate has on the prices for their
goods.

For Italy, at this point it seems joining the EU came at a high cost, perhaps higher
than expected. When Italy had control of its own monetary policy with the lira, it could
simply devalue the lira in order to make Italian exports cheaper in other countries. With
the centralized monetary policy of the ECB, Italy Is now only one of thirteen national
entities involved, each of which has Its own interests regarding what kind of monetary
policy the eurozone should use. Italy may want a little devaluation of the euro, but
other countries which rely less on non-EU exports, such as Spain, do not see the high
value of the euro as such a concern.
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The question remains,"What should Italy do now? There is talk by very radical
groups within itaiy that the country should leave the EMU and return to the lira. While
this move would solve the problem of overvalued goods due to the high euro exchange
rate, it could cause unpredictable political problems that could affect the economy
negatively. One possible suggestion is that Italy needs to wait a few more years to truly
evaluate Its situation. It is very possible that the problems It Is facing right now are
simply the growing pains of joining a united European monetary union.

I do not agree with the Northern League, the most vocal proponent of a return
to the lira. Instead, Italy should encourage the ECB and the other eurozone countries to
support a slight devaluation of the euro. The currency has Increased in value so much
now that the EU has begun to voice that it needs to consider slowing the valuation of its
currency. Italy should support and hope for that course of action, which would be
helpful in aiding its already improving export sector. As mentioned earlier, while Guzzo
(2005) points out that a sharp fall in the value of the euro versus other currencies could
cause major domestic economic problems, such a more gradual and minor devaluation
of the euro would lessen or nullify the possibility of those negative effects for Italy while
aiding its struggling export sector. Then, in a few more years, it will be more apparent
whether or not Italy is facing major problems or simply went through this short period
of economic difficulties.

The euro has had a substantial effect in many of the eurozone countries.
particularly Spain and Italy. While It has hurt Italy In its international competitiveness.
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the euro is not the only cause of Italy's economic problems. The Ricardian analysis
shows the major impact that the European unified currency has had on Italy's ability to
export, but such a profound public debt cannot be ignored. Budget surpluses In recent
years have helped lower the public debt, and if the trend of surplus budgets Is
continued, the debt should continue to fall. A devaluation of the euro would help Italy
in its exports, but it would not necessarily fix the whole Italian economy. Thus, the euro
can be blamed as the main cause, although not the only factor, of the Italian economic
woes.
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VI. Appendix
A Numerical Example of Comparative Advantage
Suppose that the unit labor requirement for Italian production of a bottle of wine
is 1 labor hour and the unit labor requirement for Italian production of motors
(aim) is 20 labor hours. It Is evident that the units of labor hours cancel out in the
fraction. So the production of a bottle of Italian wine costs 1/20 of an Italian motor.
Also suppose that China can produce a bottle of wine for

= 2 labor hours and can

produce a motor for aim ~ ^5 labor hours. Thus, the production of a bottle of Chinese
wine costs 2/15 of a Chinese motor to produce. Since 1/20 < 2/15, Italy will produce
and export wine to China. In addition, these numbers give us the costs of production of
motors in each country In terms of bottles of wine. For China, one motor gives up
production of 15/2 bottles of wine, while in Italy a motor requires the equivalent of the
production of 20 bottles of wine. Since 15/2 < 20, China will produce and export motors
to Italy.
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